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Gazza v. New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation?'
(decided February 18, 1997)
Petitioner, Joseph F. Gazza, a landowner who purchased
property in a residentially zoned district in Southampton, New
York was denied permission to build a single family home on his
property, since it had been partially inventoried as tidal wetlands
by defendant, the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation [hereafter "DEC"].74 Petitioner brought an article
78 proceeding75 to review the DEC's determination, arguing that
the denial of a building variance pursuant to environmental
regulation76 effects an unconstitutional taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution" and Article

73 89 N.Y.2d 603, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 58 (1997).
74 Id. at 608-09, 679 N.E.2d at 1036-38, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 556-58.
75 N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsERv. LAW § 25-0404 (McKinney 1997). This section
provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by the issuance, denial suspension or
revocation of a permit may within thirty days from the date
of commissioner's order seek judicial review pursuant to
article 78 of the civil practice law and rules in the supreme
court for the county in which the tidal wetlands are
located ....
Id.
76 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.6 (a) (1997). This section
sets forth New York's wetlands development restrictions as follows:
No person shall undertake any new regulated activity on any
tidal wetland or any adjacent area except in compliance with
the following restrictions: (1) the minimum setback of all
principal buildings and all other structures that are in excess
of 100 square feet... shall be 75 feet landward from the
most landward edge of any tidal wetland... (2) the
minimum setback of any on site sewage disposal septic

tank... shall be 100 feet landward ....

Id.
'nU.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall ...be deprived of ...property without due process of law;
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I, section 7 of the New York State Constitution78 for which he

must be justly compensated.79
Petitioner based his claim on two theories: (1) although he
knew when he purchased the property that the wetland regulations
burdened it, he was not bound by such knowledge since he did
not suffer a regulatory taking until the variance was denied°; and
(2) the requirement that petitioner prove every element of his
claim beyond a reasonable doubt s' in order to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the wetlands
regulations places upon him an onerous burden which denies him
equal protection under the law.82
The court rejected petitioner's claims. 83 It held that because

petitioner knew that there were wetlands limitations on the
property when he purchased it, he did not own an interest in the
right to build a residence on the property which could be taken
away. 4 The court declined to review whether the standard of
proof was too burdensome on the petitioner, but held that even
with a lesser standard such as the preponderance of the evidence
standard, petitioner would have failed to meet his burden to show
that the regulations and denial of a permit constituted a "taking"
under either federal or state standards of proof.85

nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
Id.
78 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Article I, section 7 provides in part that:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Id.
79 Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 89 N.Y.2d 603, 608,
679 N.E.2d 1035, 1036, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1997).
80 Id. at 611, 679 N.E.2d at 1038, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
"' Id. (citing St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66, 76, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885,
505 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (1986) (stating that a "landowner who claims that a
land regulation has effected a taking of his property bears a heavy burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the regulation
and of proving every element of his claim beyond a reasonable doubt.")).
82 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 611, 679 N.E.2d at 1038, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
8
3Id. at 608, 679 N.E.2d at 1036, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
84 Id. at 616, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
85 Id. at 611, 679 N.E.2d at 1038, 657 N.Y.S. at 558.
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Petitioner purchased a 43,500 square foot parcel located in the

Village of Quogue, Town of Southampton for $100,000, with full
knowledge that 65% of the property had been previously
inventoried as tidal wetlands by the DEC.8 6 According to district
court findings, the purchase price reflected the fact that a
variance would be required to build a residence on the property."
Otherwise, as Petitioner himself indicated, the parcel would have
been worth $396,000.88
Subsequent to his purchase, petitioner applied to the DEC for
two setback variances which, if granted, would have allowed him
to build a single family residence and a septic system at a
specified distance from the tidal wetlands boundary. 9 After a

hearing, an Administrative Law Judge recommended that the
application be denied. 9° The DEC adopted the judge's report,
concluding that "the petitioner had not sustained his burden of
showing that the variances would have no adverse impact on the
tidal wetlands. . .. " The commission found that the proposed
construction threatened both humans and marine life, that
flooding problems would ensue, and that contaminants from the
septic system would threaten the area. 92 However, they suggested
the petitioner consider alternate uses for the property, as
86 Id.

at 608, 679 N.E.2d at 1036, 657 N.Y.S. at 556.

87Id.

8 Id.
89 Id.

90 Id. at 609, 679 N.E.2d at 1036, 657 N.Y.S. at 556.
9, Id. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.11 (1997).

This

section provides in pertinent part:
[The department [of environmental conservation] shall have
authority in connection with its review of an application for
permit under this Part to modify the application of any
provisions in such a manner that the spirit and intent of the
pertinent provisions shall be observed, the public safety and
welfare are secured and substantial justice done and that
action pursuant to the variance will not have an undue
adverse impact on the present or potential value of any tidal
wetland ....
Id.
9 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 609, 679 N.E.2d at 1037, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
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recommended by the Administrative Law Judge, including the
construction of a parking lot, dock or catwalk. 93
Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the
DEC's determination. 94 The district court dismissed petitioner's
claim that the DEC's decision constituted an unconstitutional
"taking," holding that the petitioner failed to show that the
property had lost "but a bare residue" of its economic value. 95 It
based its decision, in part, on the testimony of a real estate
appraiser at the hearing, who valued the property, as restricted, at
approximately $80,000, not much less than the original purchase
price of $100,000.96 Furthermore, since the petitioner knew there
were limitations on the wetlands when he purchased the property,
the court held that he had no "reasonable investment backed
expectation" that he could build a residence there. 97 The
Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal on similar grounds.9"
In reviewing petitioner's claims on appeal, the Court of
Appeals looked to the intent of the legislature in enacting the tidal
wetlands legislation, noting that it was designed to strike a
balance between economic and ethical considerations, permitting
reasonable economic use of wetlands, while also preserving and
protecting them.99 Next, the court laid out a two step process it
utilizes in reviewing such legislation: (1) to determine whether
the permit denial is supported by substantial evidence and (2) to
determine in the same hearing whether the restriction constitutes

93 Id. at 609, 679 N.E.2d at 1036, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
94Id. at 609, 679 N.E.2d at 1037, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 557.

95Id. at 610, 679 N.E.2d at 1037, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 610-11, 679 N.E.2d at 1037, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (citing Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
9'Id. (rejecting petitioner's takings claim noting that "central to this appeal is
the fact that at the time he purchased the property, the petitioner knew of the
wetlands restrictions that 'burdened' it.").
99 Id. at 612, 679 N.E.2d at 1038, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 558. See also Spears v.
Bearle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636, 397 N.E.2d 1304 (1979) (stating
that the legislature designed the Freshwater Wetlands Act to "secure the
natural benefits of freshwater wetlands, consistent with the general welfare and
beneficial economic, social and agricultural development of the state.").
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an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation.'D° As the
Petitioner conceded that the permit denial was supported by
substantial evidence, the main analysis turned on whether the
denial of a permit placed such an onerous burden on the property
to constitute an unconstitutional taking.'°'
Initially, the court emphasized the long recognized principle
that a property interest must exist before it may be "taken." 102 It
relied on United States v. Willow River Power Co.,1 which held
that a company did not have a legally protected property interest
in the high-water level of the St. Croix River even though
petitioner relied on such water to maintain the efficiency of its
hydroelectric plant.' m Since the company never had a legal
property interest in the level of the water, the court held they
were not due compensation from the United States for raising the
water level. 5 Likewise, in the case at bar, the court held that
the Petitioner never owned an absolute right to build a residence
on his land without a variance. 6 The limitation on the property
existed at the time petitioner bought the property. 07 Therefore,
he could not validly base a takings claim on an interest he never
owned. lo8
However, the court noted, the State exercise of its police power
of eminent domain is limited by a showing that it has a valid
legislative purpose.'07 For example, in a New York case, Vernon

100 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 612-13, 679 N.E.2d at 1039, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
101 Id. at 613, 679 N.E.2d at 1039, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
102 id.

324 U.S. 499 (1945).
Id. at 502-03 (stating "economic uses are fights only when they are
rights.").
legally
10 1d.protected
at 511.
106 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 615, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560; See
also Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976) (stating that "the 'value' of property is
not a concrete or tangible attribute but an abstraction derived from the
economic uses to which the property may be put. .. ").
1071d. at 616, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
103

104

10 3 Id.

109 Id. at 614, 679 N.E.2d at 1039, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
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Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, ° the Court of Appeals
held that a purchaser of land may test the validity of a zoning
ordinance, even though he was aware of the restriction at the time
of purchase."' An invalid ordinance is still invalid regardless of
whether the purchaser had knowledge its existence.1 2 Although
this might have been a valid argument in the case at bar, the court
noted, Petitioner did not claim that wetlands regulation was
beyond the State's power." 3
Next, the court went on to reject Petitioner's claim under an
alternative federal analysis." 4 The court relied on the Supreme
Court case, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, "5
which set forth several factors to be considered in evaluating a
"takings" claim: (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and (3) the character of the
governmental action." 6
Specifically, Penn Central held that the economic impact on the
landowner may be reflected by the economic viability of the
property post-regulation." 7 However, a diminution in property
In
value alone will be insufficient to establish a taking." 8
applying these principles to Gazza, the court found that a minor
diminution in property value (from the original purchase price) of
$20,000 was not so significant as to constitute a taking." 9

307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
"I Id. at 500, 121 N.E.2d at 520.
110
112

Id.

Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 614, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
Id. at 616, 679 N.E.2d at 1041, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
1.5438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the refusal of the New York City
Landmark Preservation Commission to approve plans for construction of a
fifty story office building over Grand Central Terminal did not constitute an
unconstitutional taking).
116Id. at 124.
17 Id. at 138 n.36.
113

114

8
..
Id. at 131.
119 Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 89 N.Y.2d 603, 619,
679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 563 (1997).
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Secondly, Penn Central considered an analysis of investment
backed expectations particularly relevant120 In Penn Central, the
Court held that regulation under New York City's landmark
Preservation Law preventing the construction of a 50 story office
building over Grand Central Terminal was not a taking.' 2 ' A
crucial part of the Court's decision was the fact that Plaintiff's
investment backed expectations would still be realized, since
utilizing the terminal as it was intended would not only be
profitable, but Plaintiff would continue to bring in a reasonable
return on his investment.22
In Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto,3 the Court held that "reasonable
investment backed expectations must be more than a unilateral
expectation or an abstract need."" Therefore, it concluded, the
Environmental Protection Agency's utilization of plaintiffs trade
secrets regarding pesticides did not constitute a taking since
plaintiff was advised that his data might be revealed during public
hearings if necessary."Z
In applying these tests to Gazza, the court held that petitioner
could not have had a "reasonable investment backed expectation"
that he would be granted a variance in order to build a
residence. 1 2 Petitioner knew that the property was subject to the
wetlands restriction, as reflected in the significantly low purchase
price, and that there was the possibility that the DEC would deny
his application for a variance. 27

120 Id. at 618, 679 N.E.2d at 1042,
121Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.

12
123

657 N.Y.S.2d at 562.

Id. at 136.

467 U.S. 986 (1984) (finding that the applicant for registration of

pesticide had no reasonable investment based expectation that the
Environmental Protection Agency would keep health, safety and environmental
data
submitted confidential beyond the limits prescribed by statute).
24
1 Id. at 1005.
125

Id. at 1006.

" Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 89 N.Y.2d 603, 619,
679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 563 (1997).
127
Id.
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The character of the government action is a third consideration

in a "taking" determination. 12' For example, complete physical
occupations have been considered takings per se requiring just
compensation. 129 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'3°

a landowner who purchased two residential lots with the intention
of building on the land, brought suit when the South Carolina

Beachfront Act barred him from doing so.'31 The Court held that
"when the real owner has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,

that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking." 132
However,

a partial limitation on property may not be

considered a taking.131 In Goldblatt v. Hempstead,134 the Court
held that a regulation that "deprives the property of its most
beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional." 135 In Gazza,
the court determined that the DEC's denial of a variance was not
a taking since the property's economic value had not been
completely extinguished and the land could still be used for the
recreational purposes recommended by the Administrative Law

Judge. 136

"I Id. at 616, 679 N.E.2d at 1041, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (citing Penn
Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124).
129 Id.
130 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
13

Id. at 1006-07.

Id. at 1019.
Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 618, 679 N.E.2d at 1042, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
'34 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (finding that a town ordinance regulating dredging
and pit excavation was a valid police regulation, and did not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of defendant's property).
131Id. at 592.
136 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 619, 679 N.E.2d at 1043, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
Petitioner argued that the economic value to the property was totally
extinguished, since it was unlikely that he would be granted even a recreational
variance from the local village in order to build a dock, parking lot or catwalk
as suggested by the Administrative Law Judge. Id. However, the court
rejected this argument, explaining that there was "ample and convincing
evidence" to the contrary. Id.
332

133
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In conclusion, a takings claim is likely to fail under the Federal
and New York State constitutional standards when a petitioner
was aware of the inherent limitations on the property at the time
of purchase 37 and the governmental body had a valid legislative
purpose for its regulation. 3 1 In addition, when a property has
merely suffered a diminution in value,' 39 the regulation has not

interfered with the petitioner's reasonable investment backed
expectations,"4 and the limitation does not entirely extinguish the
Petitioner's economic and recreational use of the property, no
taking will have occurred. 4'
Kim v. City of New York'
(decided February 18, 1997)
Plaintiff, Soon Duck Kim, and other property owners, appealed
from the Supreme Court's decision denying plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and granting the City of New York's
[Hereinafter, "City"], cross-motion for summary judgment. 43
The Supreme Court concluded that no taking of the plaintiffs'
property had occurred "because the City was authorized by New
York City Charter § 2904'" to compel [the] plaintiffs to raise

Id.
' Id. at 614, 679 N.E.2d at 1039, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
39
1 Id. at 618, 679 N.E.2d at 1042, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
4
1 0 Id.
141 Id. at 619, 679 N.E.2d at 1043, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
142 90 N.Y.2d 1, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145, cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 50 (1997).
143 Id. at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
144 N.Y. Crry CHARTER § 2904 [2] (1992) provides that:
The owner of any property at his own cost, shall... fill any
sunken lot or lots comprising part or all of such property or
cut down any raised lot or lots comprising part or all of such
property whenever the transportation department shall so
order pursuant to standards and policies of the transportation
department ....
In the event that the owner fails to comply
with the provisions of this section, the transportation
137
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